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ABSTRACT
In this paper we characterize empirically the comovements of macro variables typically
observed in middle income countries, as well as the ‘boom-bust cycle’ that has been observed during
the last two decades. We find that many countries that have liberalized their financial markets, have
witnessed the development of lending booms.  Most of the time the boom gradually decelerates. But
sometimes the boom ends in twin currency and banking crises, and is followed by a protracted credit
crunch that outlives a short-lived recession. We also find that during lending booms there is a real
appreciation and the nontradables (N) sector grows faster than the tradables (T) sector. Meanwhile,
the opposite is true in the aftermath of crisis. We argue that these comovements are generated by the
interaction of two characteristics of financing typical of middle income countries: risky currency
mismatch and asymmetric financing opportunities across the N- and T-sectors.
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In recent decades many middle income countries have liberalized their ﬁnancial markets.
Frequently, the post-liberalization period has witnessed the development of lending booms
along which credit grows unusually fast. Most of the time the boom has a soft landing,
whereby credit growth gradually decelerates. But sometimes the boom ends in twin cur-
rency and banking crises, and is followed by a protracted credit crunch. Interestingly, the
patterns followed by several macroeconomic variables during the post-liberalization period
are common across this set of countries.
In this paper we characterize empirically these common patterns and present a ratio-
nalization for them. First, we characterize the evolution of credit following ﬁnancial liber-
alizations and the ‘boom-bust cycles’ that occasionally occur. Second, we show that the
comovements of key macroeconomic variables exist more generally, even if we do not con-
dition on the occurrence of crises. As we shall see, these patterns are diﬀerent, in many
respects, from the comovements observed in economies with well developed ﬁnancial mar-
kets, like the US. We will argue that they are generated by two credit market imperfections
that are prevalent in middle income countries: an asymmetry of ﬁnancing opportunities
across nontradables and tradables sectors, and systemic bailout guarantees. We will present
evidence that supports the existence of these imperfections, and a model that links these
imperfections to the facts.
We characterize the boom-bust cycle by means of an event study on the set of middle
income countries.1 The cycle is centered around twin crises during which a real depreciation
coincides with a banking crisis. Prior to twin crises the typical country experiences a real
appreciation and a lending boom along which credit grows unusually fast. In the aftermath
of twin crises there is typically a short-lived recession and a protracted credit crunch that
persists long after aggregate growth has resumed.
The credit crunch hits mainly small and nontradables (N) ﬁrms. In fact, N-sector pro-
duction declines relative to the output of the tradables (T) sector for several years after
the crisis, and the credit-to-deposits ratio falls. This asymmetric sectorial pattern is also
observed before a crisis as the N-sector grows faster than the T-sector.
In contrast to earlier decades, large ﬁscal deﬁcits have not taken center stage in the new
boom-bust cycles. Furthermore, investment is the component of GDP that experiences by
far the largest swings over the cycle, and at the other extreme consumption varies the least.
Panel regressions reveal that the comovements we have described exist in middle income
countries even if we do not condition on the occurrence of crises. We ﬁnd that over the post-
liberalization period credit growth is positively correlated with the ratio of N-to-T output,
with changes in the real exchange rate, and with investment growth. However, credit growth
is not signiﬁcantly correlated with either aggregate GDP growth or consumption.
These comovements and the boom-bust cycle are not observed in counties with developed
ﬁnancial markets like the US. How can we explain them? We argue that they are generated
1Our sample includes all countries where, in addition to banks, the stock market is a viable source of
ﬁnance.
1by the interaction of two characteristics of ﬁnancing typical of middle income countries:
asymmetric ﬁnancing opportunities and risky currency mismatch in the balance sheets of
banks and ﬁrms. While the T-sector has access to several sources of external ﬁnance, the
N-sector is heavily dependent on bank credit. Banks in turn are strongly exposed to the
N-sector and denominate their liabilities mostly in foreign currency. Furthermore, banks’
lending is constrained both by their capital and that of the ﬁrms they lend to.
How can we explain the simultaneous occurrence of currency mismatch and borrowing
constraints in the N-sector? On the one hand, policies that ensure agents against systemic
crises (i.e., systemic bailout guarantees), lead agents to take on more risk than they other-
wise would. This can explain risky debt denomination. On the other hand, credit market
imperfections such as imperfect enforceability of contracts or asymmetric information lead
lenders to be very conservative and give rise to credit constraints. The question arises as
to whether one can construct an internally consistent framework where guarantees do not
neutralize the credit market imperfections. Furthermore, can the interaction between these
two distortions generate the dynamic patterns that characterize the boom-bust cycle and
the comovements alluded to above? In the second part of the paper we address these issues
using the model of Schneider and Tornell (2000).
The ﬁrst key result is that the interaction of systemic guarantees and enforceability
problems generates a self-reinforcing mechanism. On the one hand, if there is suﬃcient real
exchange rate risk: (a) binding credit constraints arise and (b) it is individually optimal
for an N-sector agent to issue risky T-debt (i.e., borrow in foreign currency on a short-term
and unhedged basis). On the other hand, if many N-sector agents gamble by denominating
their debt in T goods, exchange rate risk may be endogenously created, as the economy
becomes vulnerable to self-fulﬁlling meltdowns of the banking system. If the amount of
T denominated debt is high, a real depreciation can severely squeeze cash ﬂow, or even
bankrupt banks altogether. Since they face binding borrowing constraints, they then have
to curtail lending to the N-sector. Weak investment demand from the N-sector for its own
products in turn validates the real depreciation. The systemic credit risk created by the
banking system thus induces endogenous exchange rate risk.
The second key result is that the interaction of binding borrowing constraints and T
denominated debt generates a dynamic path that resembles a boom-bust cycle. During
the boom, the real appreciation reduces the debt burden and relaxes credit constraints,
permitting unusually fast growth in the bank-dependent N-sector. This leads to further
real appreciation, further relaxation of credit constraints and so on. Since the T-sector is
not credit constrained, both the credit-to GDP and the N-to-T output ratios can follow
increasing paths. However, the existence of risky debt denomination makes the economy
vulnerable to self-fulﬁlling twin crises, during which a real depreciation coincides with both
a meltdown of the banking system and a collapse of the N-sector’s internal funds. In the
aftermath of crisis the N-sector is outperformed by the T-sector. Since banks are strongly
exposed to the N-sector, a long-lasting credit crunch outlives a brief recession.
In order to ground the mechanism we have described empirically, we present evidence
on the existence of systemic guarantees and on the asymmetry of ﬁnancing opportunities
2available across sectors. Although many countries have systemic guarantees in place, it
is practically impossible to document their existence directly. Systemic guarantees are not
limited to promises to hand out a bailout payment to lenders in case of default. More
generally, guarantees are implicit in the exchange rate rules and monetary policies a country
follows. One could argue that all countries follow policies that aim to avoid systemic crises
and therefore have implicit bailout schemes. Since in middle income countries the real
exchange rate tends to be a key price, governments tend to follow policies that serve to
insure economic actors against real exchange rate risk. Thus, if a critical mass of agents
choose not to hedge, the government will do it for them by adjusting policies.
In this paper we investigate whether there are systemic guarantees by looking at the
behavior of interest rate spreads. If markets are anticipating a bailout in bad times, expected
returns will not be as sensitive to the state of the economy. We ﬁnd that in most of the
countries in our sample, the spreads in non-crisis years are insensitive to the state of the
economy suggesting that there are indeed implicit guarantees in those countries.
We document the existence of asymmetric ﬁnancing opportunities by looking at a panel
of nearly 4000 ﬁr m ss u r v e y e db yt h eW o r l dB a n k .W eﬁnd that small ﬁrms tend to be mostly
in the N-sector, and that obtaining ﬁnancing is signiﬁcantly more challenging for ﬁrms in
the N-sector than for those in the T-sector.
The empirical ﬁndings of this paper are related to two economic policy issues: the ex-
change rate regime and limits on capital ﬂows. With respect to the former, we ﬁnd that the
patterns followed by key macroeconomic variables along the boom-bust cycle are not signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent in countries with ﬁxed exchange rates than in other countries. This suggests
that the mechanisms that generate the boom-bust cycle are not dependent on particular
features of speciﬁc exchange rate regimes or monetary policy rules.
Financial liberalizations are typically followed by lending booms. As a result, in some
policy circles it has been argued that it might be optimal to impose restrictions on capital
ﬂows and stop lending booms, as they mainly reﬂect excessive risk taking and cronism. The
evidence presented in this paper points towards a less malignant process. Although twin
crises are typically preceded by lending booms, very few lending booms end in crisis. Most
of the time lending booms end with ‘soft landings’ whereby credit gradually decelerates.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we characterize the boom-bust cycle.
In Section 3 we characterize the comovements of macroeconomic variables over the post-
liberalization period, without conditioning on the occurrence of crises. In Section 4 we
present evidence on the existence of systemic guarantees and of the asymmetric ﬁnancing
opportunities across sectors. In Section 5 we present the model. In Section 6 we link the
model to the stylized facts. Finally, in Section 7 we present the conclusions.
2. Stylized Facts
The experiences of Mexico around the Tequila crisis and of Thailand around the Asian crisis
are prototypical examples of a boom-bust cycle. In this paper we will show that several fea-
tures of such boom-bust cycles are typical of middle income countries that have experienced
3twin crises. Some of the stylized facts that constitute a boom-bust cycle are widely agreed
upon, while others have only recently appeared in the literature or have only been associated
with particular episodes.2 To illustrate these facts we use an event study that includes the
set middle income countries where, in addition to banks, the stock market is a viable source
of ﬁnance (39 countries).3 We consider the period between 1980 and 1999. We start by
describing the facts. Then we present the event windows.
2.1. The Boom-Bust Cycle
Many recent BoP crises have diﬀered from their predecessors in that currency crises have
coincided with banking crises, and the main villains have not been the traditional suspects
such as ﬁscal deﬁcits or current account deﬁcits. This does not mean, however, that the
‘new’ crises have been totally delinked from fundamentals. Rather:
(i) Twin crises are typically preceded by a real exchange rate appreciation and a lending
boom along which bank credit grows unusually fast.
During the lending boom banks fund themselves by borrowing abroad. Furthermore, they
typically over-expose themselves to the N-sector and do not hedge the implied real exchange
rate risk. Even when banks denominate loans in foreign currency, they face the risk that
households and N-sector ﬁrms will not be able to repay in the event of a real depreciation.
This is because in the event of a real depreciation the debt burden, in terms of domestic
currency, will increase signiﬁcantly.
When the crisis hits, a real depreciation takes place. Since many agents, especially
those in nontradables sectors, had denominated their debts in foreign currency during the
boom years, the real depreciation has dramatic ‘balance sheet eﬀects’: many agents see the
value of their debt mushroom, while their revenues remain ﬂat. As a result, their ability to
service their debts is reduced and their net worth plummets. There is, therefore, a sharp
deterioration of the banks’ loan portfolio, and the banking system goes under.4 To save the
banking system bailouts are granted, frequently with IMF support.5 Despite this support:
(ii) In the aftermath of a crisis there is a recession, which is typically short-lived.
Furthermore, a protracted credit crunch develops:
2See Chinn and Kletzer (2000), Demirguc-Kunt et. al. (2000), Eichengreen, et. al. (1995), Frankel and
Rose (1996), Gourinchas et. al. (2001), Gupta, Mishra and Sahay (2001), Hutchison and Neuberger (2002),
Kaminski and Reinhart (1999), Krueger and Tornell (1999), Sachs, Tornell and Velasco, (1996), and Tornell
(1999).
3We consider practically all countries with per-capita incomes between $1,000 and $18,000, plus Sweden
and Finland, who have experienced often studied twin crises. The appendix contains the list of the 39
countries we consider.
4An alternative explanation for the occurrence of banking crises is that there is a run on banks by
depositors. There is no evidence, however, that during the last two decades the problems faced by banks
have been initiated by runs (see Demirguc-Kunt et.al. (2000)).
5See Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2001).
4(iii) In the aftermath of a crisis credit falls more sharply than GDP, and the gap widens
over time even after economic growth has resumed.
The puzzling coexistence of a protracted credit crunch and GDP growth several years
after the crisis reﬂects the fact that aggregate GDP performance masks an asymmetric
sectorial pattern:
(iv) In the aftermath of crisis the tradable (T)-sector experiences an acceleration of growth
after a mild recession, while the nontradable (N)-sector experiences a sharp fall and a
sluggish recuperation. In contrast, prior to a crisis the N-sector grows faster than the
T-sector.
In the aftermath of crisis it seems as if the economy is doing well and deposit growth has
resumed. However, banks do not resume lending. Perhaps because the meltdown that occurs
during the crisis leads to poor capitalization of both the banks and the agents they lend to.
The asymmetric sectorial response indicates that the agents mainly aﬀected are households,
as well as small and N-sector ﬁrms. Large and T-sector ﬁrms are not very dependent on
bank credit, as they have access to other forms of external ﬁnance: trade credit, equity
markets and bond markets. In contrast, in middle income countries N-sector agents are
heavily dependent on bank credit, which is primarily determined by collateral values, not
investment opportunities.6 A related fact is that:
(v) In the aftermath of crisis there is a sustained increase in the spread between lending and
deposit rates.
Facts (iii)-(v) suggest the following transmission mechanism. When the crisis hits, both
the interest rate and the spread jump. While large and T-ﬁrms are able to shift away from
bank credit to other forms of external ﬁnance, small and N-ﬁrms are not. This results in a
deterioration of the banks’ credit pool, which in turn feeds back into a higher spread. The
outcome is a protracted credit crunch, during which increases in the stock of outstanding
bank credit reﬂect mostly ‘evergreening’ rather than fresh loans. Along this path the T-
sector may initially suﬀer a mild and short-lived decline, after which it will grow rapidly.
The upshot is that the N-to-T output ratio will decline even though aggregate GDP increases.
In order to construct a theoretical explanation it is important to determine which com-
ponents of GDP drive the typical boom-bust cycle. Is a twin crisis typically preceded by a
consumption boom or an investment boom? Is there a big ﬁscal expansion and/or a current
account deterioration before a crisis? In answer to these questions, we ﬁnd that
(vi) Investment is the component of GDP that exhibits by far the largest (and statistically
signiﬁcant) deviations from tranquil times, while consumption deviations are very mild
and insigniﬁcant.
6Firm level evidence on the asymmteric ﬁnancing opportunities of small and large as well as tradable and
nontradable ﬁrms has been presented by Gelos and Werner (2002) for the case of Mexico.
5To discriminate among models it is also important to know whether crises are self-fulﬁlling
or are generated by a large exogenous shock. It is diﬃcult to determine whether a large
exogenous shock was present. We looked to the usual suspects and we ﬁnd that:
(vii) There is no signiﬁcant deterioration in either the terms of trade or the US interest
rate in the year prior to the crisis.
Stylized facts (i)-(vii) complete our description of a boom-bust cycle. The question we
address next is whether the properties of the boom-bust cycle vary across exchange rate
regimes. In particular, is it true that only countries with ﬁxed exchange rates experience
boom-bust cycles? We ﬁnd that
(viii) The boom-bust cycle under ﬁxed exchange rates is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the
cycle under non-ﬁxed regimes.7
It is interesting to note that during the 1980s and 1990s the US did not experience the
boom-bust cycle we have described. To make this clear Figure 8 depicts the evolution of
key macro variables for Mexico and US. It is evident that the US has experienced neither
pronounced asymmetrical sectorial patterns nor dramatic swings in the evolution of credit
and the real exchange rate. In contrast, the evolution of the economy in Mexico, for example,
exhibits a dramatic boom-bust cycle.
2.2. Lending Booms
Next, we shift our attention from cycles to lending booms in order to emphasize that although
almost every crisis has been preceded by a lending boom, not all lending booms end in crisis.
To the contrary:8
(ix) The typical lending boom does not end in crisis, but with a ‘soft landing.’
Soft landings suggest that not all lending booms reﬂect either excessive risk taking or
cronism. Instead, they may be a symptom of a less malignant process. The fact that bank
credit is the only source of external funds for a big set of agents in the economy implies that
many agents are not able to exploit all investment opportunities. Instead, their investment
is mainly determined by collateral values. In such a world lending booms are episodes during
which borrowing constraints are eased.
A related fact is that even during lending booms crises are rare events. In our sample
the probability that there is a crisis in a given country-year, conditional on a lending boom,
is around 6%.
The question then arises as to what determines the timing of a lending boom. Perhaps
these episodes follow structural reforms that improve the long run prospects of a country.
7This stylized fact is related to the equivalence of equilibria under ﬁxed and ﬂoating exchange rates
established by Helpman (1981).
8This fact has been established by Gourinchas et. al. (2001).
6To address this issue we consider the ﬁnancial liberalization date as a proxy for the timing
of such reforms. We ﬁnd that in our set of countries:
(x) A ﬁnancial liberalization is typically followed by a lending boom.
T h ep r e v i o u st w of a c t ss u g g e s tt h a tﬁnancial liberalization, and the reforms that typically
go with it, make the future look brighter than the present. In anticipation, credit constrained
agents try to expand capacity to satisfy that increased future demand for their products
and services. The implied deﬁcits are frequently ﬁnanced by foreign capital inﬂows from
abroad, which are channeled to domestic agents through the domestic banking system. Why
aren’t these ﬂows taking place through the equity or bond markets? Because there are
severe enforceability problems, and domestic banks have speciﬁc lending skills and collection
abilities. Domestic banks, in turn, must issue short term debt in order to be able to get
funds (see Diamond and Rajan (2000)). Furthermore, since systemic bailout guarantees
are typically present there are incentives for currency mismatch to arise (see Schneider and
Tornell (2000)).9
Certainly, very large ﬁrms and those in the tradables sector can access world capital
markets. However, this is not true for the majority of ﬁrms operating in the economy.
2.3. Event Study
The ﬁgures below show the average behavior, across our set of 39 countries, of several
macroeconomic variables around twin currency and banking crises during the period 1980-
1999. Index t in the ﬁgures refers to the year during which a twin crisis takes place (we say
that there is a crisis at t if both a currency and a banking crises occur during year t,o ri f
o n eo c c u r sa tta n dt h eo t h e ra tt +1 ).
The graphs below are the visual representations of the point estimates and standard errors
from regressions in which the respective variable in the graph is the dependent variable,
regressed on time dummies preceding and following a crisis. The panel data estimations
account for diﬀerences in the mean, by allowing for ﬁxed eﬀects, as well as for diﬀerences
in the variance, by using a GLS estimator. The heavy line represents the average deviation
relative to tranquil times. The thin lines represent the 95% conﬁdence interval. The point
estimates corresponding to the event windows in the text are reported in the appendix.10
Figure 1 shows that during the year prior to the crisis the typical economy in our set of
countries experiences a 5% appreciation relative to tranquil times, and that this appreciation
is statistically signiﬁcant.
9Stylized facts (ix) and (x) are related to the ﬁndings of Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001), who characterize
stock market cycles in a sample of 28 countries. They ﬁnd that within three years of opening up the ﬁnancial
system, boom-bust cycles become more pronounced. However, over the long run these cycles are smoother
in liberalized economies.
10The patterns in the event windows we present below are basically the same as the patterns that would
arise if we were to consider a subset of countries that have experienced well known crises: Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Indonesia, Finland, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Phillippines, Sweden and Thailand. The event windows
for this subset of countries is presented in the appendix, Figure B.
7Figure 1: Real Appreciation
Note: the real exchange rate is proxied by the ratio of PPI/CPI
T h e r ee x i td i ﬀerent views on how to better measure changes in the real exchange rate.
Engle (1999) has argued that most of the variance in the real exchange rate is due to vari-
ations in the relative price of tradables at home and abroad. While this appears to be case
for the high income countries he considers, Betts and Kehoe (2001) ﬁnd in a study of 52
countries over the period 1980-2000, that variations in the real exchange rate reﬂect mainly
changes in the relative price of nontradables and tradables.
In this paper we take the second view and proxy the real exchange rate by the PPI-to-CPI
ratio. A similar pattern emerges when looking at the standard deﬁnition of real eﬀective
exchange rates, such as in the International Financial Statistics of the IMF.
Figure 2 illustrates the existence of a lending boom in several diﬀerent ways. Panels (a)-
(b) refer to the stock of real credit: during the two years prior to the crisis its growth rate11
is signiﬁcantly higher than during tranquil times (around 3%), and its level is signiﬁcantly
above the Hodrik-Prescott trend.12 Panels (c)-(d) show that the same behavior is exhibited
by the credit-to-GDP and the credit-to-deposits ratios.
When twin crises hit there is an average real depreciation of around 16% relative to
tranquil times (which is statistically signiﬁcant). Real credit growth declines back to the
growth rates that are observed during tranquil times, after being above the tranquil time
mean in t − 1 and t − 2. The lending boom thus comes to an end in the year of the crisis.13
11Many papers look at deviations from a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter rather than growth rates. This has the
advantage of having a more ﬂexible trend and a corresponding deﬁnition of cycles. However, the HP-ﬁlter
can be a poor indicator of the trend, if there are structural breaks in the beginning or the end of the period,
i np a r t i c u l a ri ft h es a m p l ei sv e r ys h o r t .W et h e r e f o re look at both, growth rates and deviations from the
HP-trend.
12The deviation of the HP-trend is not exactly equal to zero on average for all countries. Therefore, to be
more precise, the graph shows the “deviation from the average deviation from the HP-Trend during tranquil
times”. However the later is close to zero in most countries.
13Two comments are in order. While the growth rates are easily comparable across countries, the levels
are not due to diﬀerent long term trends, structural breaks, etc. (unless they represent the level of a ratio,
such as credit/deposits or credit/GDP). The HP-trend is therefore a trend corrected proxy for the levels.
8Let us consider now what happens in the aftermath of crisis. As we can see in Figure
3, both during and the year after the crisis the growth rate of GDP is approximately 5%
below its level during tranquil times (panel a). The growth rate starts recovering at t +2
a n di ta t t a i n si t st r a n q u i lt i m em e a ng r o w t hr a t eb yt+3. Adding the average GDP growth
during tranquil times of 2.8%, it follows that the recession lasts only for 2 years (t and t+1).
Looking at deviations from an HP-trend tells the same story (panel b).
Figure 2: Bank Credit
a) Real Credit (growth rates) b) Real Credit (deviations from HP-Trend)
c) Credit/GDP d) Credit/Deposits
Note: “Credit” is the credit provided by domestic deposit money banks to the non-government -, non financial
institution – private Sector. The Hodrick-Prescott trend is constructed with λ =100. Deposits are the sum of
demand deposits and time-, savings- and foreign currency deposits, by domestic deposit money banks.
Figure 2 shows that in the year after the onset of the crisis credit falls more severely than
aggregate GDP. The puzzling fact is that the ‘credit crunch’ becomes more severe through
time: the credit-to-deposits and credit-to-GDP ratios decline monotonically. Even by t +3
t h e r ei sn os i g no far e v e r s a lo ft h ec r e d i tc r u n c h . I nf a c t ,a tt +3the credit-to-deposits
Second, the fact that the HP deviations are positive at t may reﬂect the ‘evergreening eﬀect.’
9ratio becomes signiﬁcantly lower than its tranquil time’s level! Put another away, from the
onset of the crisis until t +3GDP experiences a cumulative growth rate loss of 13%, while
the cumulative loss in real credit is about 30%. It is interesting, though, that not all of the
ﬁnancial deepening gains made during the boom are lost during the bust, as suggested by
the behavior of the credit-to-GDP ratio.
Figure 3: Aggregate Output
a) Real GDP (growth rates)  b) Real GDP (deviations from HP-Trend)
Figure 4 looks at the ratio of nontradables-to-tradables production. As we can see, prior
to the crisis the N/T ratio is signiﬁcantly above its tranquil times level, while in the aftermath
of the crisis the N/T ratio follows a declining path, and it becomes signiﬁcantly lower than
its tranquil times level by t+3. Interestingly, this path is quite similar to that followed by
the credit-to-deposits ratio in Figure 2.
Figure 4: Non-tradables-to-Tradables Output Ratio
Note: Construction, Services and Manufacturing where classified as N or T, according to the variance of the
sectorial real exchange rate reported in the appendix. In cases where sectoral price data where not available for
Construction, Construction was classified as N by default.
We proxy N-sector and T-sector production with data for construction, manufactures
10and services. Since the price of N-goods tracks international prices less closely than that of
T-goods, for each country we classify as N(T) sector in which the sectorial real exchange rate
varies the most(the least). Construction is never classiﬁed as a T-sector, while for services
and manufacturing the choice between N and T varies across countries.1415
Figure 5 exhibits the behavior of the spread for a set of 11 countries for which we have
good data.16 The ﬁgure shows that when the crisis hits, there is an upward jump in the
spread between lending and deposits rates. Moreover, the spread remains signiﬁcantly higher
3 years after the onset of the crisis.
Figure 5: Interest Rate Spread
Note: The interest rate spread is the interest rate charged by banks on loans to prime customers minus the interest











t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3
Figure 6 looks at the behavior of GDP’s components relative to tranquil times. Invest-
14The N-sector is proxied by construction in 17 countries, by services in 22 countries and by manufacturing
in 5 countries. The T-sector is manufacturing in 39 cases and services in 5 cases. We consider that the
criterion we use captures better the concept we want to measure than the exports-to-production ratio. In
any case the results are robust to changes in the deﬁnition of non-tradables, as for most countries both
indicators coincide.
15Evidence on the evolution of the N-to-T output ratio based on ﬁrm level data is more diﬃcult to obtain.
Most surveys on tradable and non-tradable ﬁrms, such as the Word Business Economic Survey (WBES), only
have data for one year and do not allow us to trace the time path of output throughout a crisis. An exception
is the FACS data set of the World Bank (Firm analysis and competitiveness survey). Hallward-Driemeier
(2000) reports that exporters recover better after the crisis than Non-Exporters. Other data sets, such as
Worldscope, contain information about tradable and non-tradable ﬁrms in the time series dimension, but
include only large, stock-listed ﬁrms and the patterns become more diﬃcult to interpret in the context of our
model. From our perspective, all of these ﬁrms would belong to the T-Sector. The Evidence on large, stock
listed ﬁrms is mixed. Borensztein and Lee (2000) ﬁnd for Korea, that large chaebol ﬁrms do not have easier
access to external ﬁnance than other stock listed ﬁrms. On the other hand they ﬁnd, that export oriented
ﬁrms experienced an increase in sales after the crisis. Using the Worldscope database, Forbes (2002) ﬁnds
that in a set of 42 countries stock listed ﬁrms with a higher share of foreign sales exposure have a signiﬁcantly
better performance after depreciations.
16Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Finland, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Phillippines, Sweden and
Thailand.
11ment exhibits a signiﬁcantly higher growth rate of 2-3% during the three years prior to a
crisis and a lower growth rate of 1-2% during t+1 ,t+2and t+3 . For consumption, there
is neither an increase before the crisis, nor a decrease after the crisis. Government expen-
diture is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, except for the year of the crisis and in t +2 ,w h e ni ti s
signiﬁcantly higher. Lastly, exports are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from tranquil times in the
build up, but clearly are above in the aftermath of a crisis. This pattern is consistent with
our previous observation that the T-sector suﬀers less after the crisis than the N-sector.
Figure 6: Components of GDP
a) Investment/GDP b) Consumption/GDP
c) Government Expenditure/GDP d) Net Exports/GDP
Figure 7 addresses the question of whether crises are caused by ‘big exogenous shocks.’
It shows that both at t and at t − 1 t h et e r m so ft r a d ea n dt h eU Si n t e r e s tr a t ea r en o t
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than their tranquil times means. Of course, there might be other
e x o g e n o u ss h o c k st h a tr o c kt h eb o a t .T h ep o i n ti st h a tn e i t h e rt h et e r m so ft r a d en o rt h e
US interest rate can be invoked to explain the occurrence of crises. Furthermore, to the best
of our knowledge, no one has yet identiﬁed any exogenous shock as the cause of well known
crises, such as the Tequila or Asian crisis.
12Figure 7: External Shocks?
a) Terms of Trade b) US Federal Funds Rate
Figure 8 presents the evolution of key variables for Mexico and the US. Here we choose
the period 1989 to 1999 for Mexico and 1986 to 1996 for the United States, as the early 1990s
are often argued to have been characterized by a credit crunch in the US. We ﬁnd that the
behavior of the main variables around the 1994 crisis in Mexico and the 1991 recession in
the US are fundamentally diﬀerent. In particular, asymmetric sectorial patterns are evident
in Mexico, while not in the US.17 A common feature is that real GDP recovered quickly in
both countries.
17In these graphs, tradable output in both countries is proxied by manufacturing and non-tradable output
is proxied by construction.
13Figure 8: Credit, GDP and the N-to-T output ratio in Mexico and the US
Mexico United States
Note: This figure displays the time path of real domestic credit, the real exchange rate and the ratio of non-
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In order to investigate whether the boom-bust cycles are dependent on whether the
exchange rate regime is ﬁxed, we break our set of countries into two groups: ﬁxed and
non-ﬁxed. There are two ways to make this classiﬁcation: de jure and de facto. Figure 9
shows the event windows corresponding to the de facto classiﬁcation by Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger (2000).18 Although there are diﬀerences in the details, all of the variables
18T h ee v e n tw i n d o w sf o rt h ed ej u r ec l a s i ﬁcation, based on Berger et.al. (2000) are reported in Figure A
14display patterns that are broadly similar between the two groups of countries, both before
and after the crisis.
in the appendix. The graphs look qualitatively the same as those in Figure 9. In fact, for most countries in
our sample de jure and de facto indicators coincide. A notable exception is Mexico 1994, which was ﬁxed de
facto, but not ﬁxed de jure.










Note: Fixed and non-fixed regimes are determined according to the de facto classification by Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger (2001).
To see whether lending booms typically end with a ‘soft landing,’ not in a crash, we
cannot center the analysis around a crisis as we have done so far. Instead, we need to
consider all country/years and deﬁne what we mean by the beginning of a lending boom.
There are several ways in which this can be done. We will say that a lending boom starts
at t if real credit grows by more than 10% p e ry e a rd u r i n gt and t +1 . Figure 10 depicts
the typical lending boom. Panel (a) shows that if a boom starts at t, credit growth will be
signiﬁcantly above the HP trend for 6 years. Furthermore, after an initial buildup phase,
credit growth starts to gradually decelerate at t+4and it lands softly to its trend by t+6.
Panel (b) shows that the same pattern arises if we look at real credit growth rates. In this
case the duration of the boom is somewhat shorter but also fades out gradually.
Another way of investigating whether there is a soft landing is to look at conditional
probabilities of crises and booms as we do in Table 1. Take the case in which a lending boom
is a pair of country-years in which credit grows by 20% or more. Table 1 shows that crises
tend to be preceded by booms: p(lb|cr)=9 1 % . However, the converse is not true: if a boom
starts at t, the probability of a crisis in either t +2or t +3is approximately p(cr|lb)=6 % .
This is a rather small number, although relatively much bigger than the probability of a
17crisis in tranquil times, which is 3.9%.
To see whether ﬁnancial liberalization is typically followed by a lending boom we use the
liberalization dates of Bekaert et. al. (2001), and follow a similar procedure as in Figure
10. Panel (a) in Figure 11 shows that the growth rate of credit is signiﬁcantly above its
tranquil time mean for 5 years after liberalization. Panel (b) shows that starting in the third
year after liberalization the deviation of real credit from its HP trend becomes signiﬁcantly
positive.19
19Since ﬁnancial liberalization constitutes a structural break in the series, the interpretation of tranquil
times is less clear. However for our purposes the dynamic pattern is relevant and the increase of credit
after liberalization is clear regardless of the mean credit growth that exisits in the years not covered by the
dummies in the regression.
18Figure 10: Soft Landing
a)  Deviation from HP-Trend b) Growth rates
Note:  Time t in this figure corresponds to the ‘beginning of a lending boom,’ which is defined as the fist year of
a period of at least 2 years in which there is more that 10% real credit growth per year.
Figure 11: Real Credit after Financial Liberalization
a) Deviation from an HP-trend b) Growth rates
Note: Time t in this figure corresponds to the date of financial liberalization. Dates for financial liberalization are
taken from Baekert et.al (2001)
19Table 1: Probability of a crisis given a lending boom (and vice versa)
LB2 LB3 LB4
Pr(crisis in j+1 | LB (j)) 6.9% 6.7% 6.7%
Pr(crisis in j+2 | LB (j)) 6.3% 5.6% 8.9%
Pr(crisis in j+3 | LB (j)) 5.7% 5.6% 6.7%
Pr(crisis in tranquil times) 3.9% 4.6% 4.6%
Pr(LB | Crisis (j)) 91.1% 51.7% 31.0%
Note: LB2-LB4 denote three different definitions of a lending boom. LB2 is a period of a cumulative increase in
real credit over the past 2 years of more than 20% (30% for LB3 and 40% for LB4). Pr(crisis in j+i | LB (j)) with
i=1..3 denotes the probability of a crisis during the year j+i. Pr(crisis in tranquil times) denotes the probability of
a crisis in all other years. Pr(LB | Crisis (j)) denotes the probability that a lending boom was present within the 3
years before the crisis or during the year of the crisis .
3. Comovements
The event windows show the behavior of key several variables around twin crises. Here we
characterize the comovements of key macro variables without conditioning on the occurrence
of twin crises. We investigate whether during the last two decades there have been statisti-
cally signiﬁcant co-movements between credit growth, the real exchange rate and the N-to-T
output ratio in middle income countries. Also we investigate whether credit growth has been
correlated with investment and GDP. For instance, does credit growth commove with the real
exchange rate and the N-to-T output ratio? Does it commove with investment and GDP?
We address this question by regressing real credit growth on several variables. The panel
data estimation is implemented allowing for ﬁxed eﬀects and a GLS estimator.20 Again, we
have our set of 39 countries in the cross section dimension and the period 1980-1999 in the
time series dimension.
The ﬁrst regression in Table 2 shows that an increase in credit is associated with (i) a
real appreciation and (ii) an increase in the ratio of nontradables-to-tradables output. It is
remarkable that these partial correlations are higly signiﬁcant across diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
Correlation (i) indicates that there exist ‘balance sheet eﬀects’: in the presence of a currency
mismatch, a real appreciation deﬂates the debt burden. This increases cash ﬂow and the
ability to borrow. Correlation (ii) indicates that the N-sector is more ‘credit-constrained’
than the T-sector.
We also ﬁnd that investment growth is statistically signiﬁcant, but GDP growth is not.
Interestingly, GDP enters the regression with a negative sign. This reﬂects the puzzle we
have noted earlier: in the aftermath of crisis a credit crunch coexists with a recovery of
aggregate GDP. To investigate this further we deﬁne the interaction term GDP ∗ Dummy,
w h e r et h ed u m m yi se q u a lt oo n ei nt h ep e r i o do ft h ec r i s i s ,a n di nt h ef o l l o w i n gt h r e e
20All variables are in ﬁrst diﬀerences in oder to avoid the issues associated with non-stationarity.
20periods, while it is equal to zero otherwise. Regression 4 shows that GDP ∗ Dummy enters
with a negative sign and is statistically signiﬁcant, while GDP enters with a positive sign,
but remains insigniﬁcant. As the sum of the two coeﬃcients is clearly negative, credit
and GDP are negatively correlated in the aftermath of crisis, while there exists no statistical
relationship that adds to the information provided by investment, the real exchange rate and
N/T, otherwise. Regression 5 shows that if GDP and GDP ∗Dummy are included without
investment, the coeﬃcient on GDP is positive and the one on the interaction dummy is
negative. Both are signiﬁcant.
It is likely that some of the explanatory variables are endogenous. In order to test for the
robustness against the simultaneity problem, we estimated the model with two stage least
squares, rather than OLS, using lagged variables as instruments. This yielded qualitatively
similar results. The partial correlations reported in ﬁgure 2, of course, cannot be interpreted
as causal relations. However the fact that a simple regression reveals the co-movements we
have alluded to above is remarkable.
Table 2: Comovements of real credit growth with other macro variables
Variable Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 Reg. 5
1/Real Exchange Rate 0.421 0.264 0.308 0.435 0.307
St. Err. 0.062 0.070 0.081 0.068 0.073
P-val. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N/T 0.302 0.168 0.166 0.317 0.171
St. Err. 0.051 0.087 0.084 0.056 0.074
P-val. 0.000 0.056 0.049 0.000 0.022
Real Investment 0.241 0.297 0.327
St. Err. 0.066 0.073 0.067
P-val. 0.000 0.000 0.000
Real GDP -0.383 0.347 0.044
St. Err. 0.304 0.169 0.290
P-val. 0.210 0.041 0.881
Real GDP after crisis -0.802 -1.293
St. Err. 0.317 0.382
P-val. 0.012 0.001
Adjusted R-squared 0.340 0.377 0.377 0.353 0.407
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.670 1.600 1.605 1.670 1.693
Note: Domestic credit is the dependent variable. All panel regressions are estimated using a GLS estimator and
allowing for fixed effects. All variables enter the regression in growth rates. The variable “Real GDP after crisis”
equals real GDP times a dummy that is equal to 1 from period t to t+3, and is zero otherwise; where t is the crisis
time. Bold numbers represent significance at the 10% level.
214. Evidence on the Two Underlying Distortions
In this section we present evidence on the two distortions that underlie the mechanism that
generates boom-bust cycles: systemic guarantees and asymmetric ﬁnancing opportunities
across sectors.
Implicit bailout guarantees
Despite the fact that bailout guarantees have played an important role in several expla-
nations of crises, there is no empirical evidence supporting the existence of this distortion.
Although many countries have systemic guarantees in place, it is very diﬃcult to document
their existence directly. The diﬃculty in pinning guarantees down is that in most cases they
are implicit. To begin with, systemic guarantees are not limited to promises to hand out a
bailout payment to lenders in case of default. In most cases systemic guarantees are implicit
in the exchange rate regime and monetary policy rules that are in place in a given country.
Since in most instances one of the objectives of policymakers is to avoid sharps drops in
output, they will implement policies that are, de facto, implicit guarantees against systemic
crises.21
The question arises as to how to go about ﬁnding implicit guarantees. We address this
question by looking at the behavior of interest rate spreads. The idea is that if there exist
guarantees, the spread will, ceteribus paribus, be insensitive to a deterioration in the average
quality of loans, assuming of course, that no crisis has yet occurred. When a crisis occurs,
the economy suﬀers a credit crunch and both the quality of loans collapses and the spread
skyrockets.
An ideal way to measure the evolution of the loans’ quality is with the ‘true’ share of
non-performing loans (NPLs). Unfortunately, such data in time series form does not exist
for most middle income countries. A good proxy for an increase in NPLs is the occurrence
of a lending boom in the recent past. This is because when there is a sharp acceleration
in credit, the monitoring capacity of both banks and regulators is diminished, so that there
is an increase in the likelihood of granting credit to bad projects. The increase in the
share of NPLs may take some time to materialize because it takes time for a given loan to
become non-performing and because during the boom a lot of new loans are being granted.
Nonetheless, after some time NPLs must become a problem for the banking system. This is
true regardless of whether NPLs are oﬃcially recorded.
To capture this idea we run the following panel regression
ij,t = αj + α1LBj,t−1 + α2Dj,t · LBj,t−1 + εj,t, (4.1)
where ij,t is the real lending rate in country j at time t, minus the federal funds rate of the
United States. LBj,t−1 is a dummy that indicates the existence of a lending boom. It is
equal to one if during the past 2 years real credit has grown by more than 10% on average.
Dj,t is a dummy variable that indicates that a twin crisis has occurred at t or t − 1.
21Systemic bailout guareantees are not the same as deposit insurance schemes, which cover individual
agents against idyosincratic risk.
22The coeﬃcient α1 measures the eﬀect of an increase in NPLs on the spread in country-
y e a r si nw h i c hac r i s i sh a sn o toc c u r r e di ne i t h e r the current or the previous years. Meanwhile,
the sum α1+α2 measures the eﬀect of an increase in NPLs on the spread during crisis times
(at t or t−1). As we discussed above, in order to isolate the eﬀe c to fg u a r a n t e e sw en e e dt o
distinguish between periods in which a crisis has not occurred recently, and periods where a
crisis has occurred recently. This is because systemic crises are typically preceded by lending
booms and during crises the spread shoots up.
The null hypothesis that there are systemic guarantees is H0 : α1 =0 . Table 3 shows
the estimates of regression (4.1). Panel (a) considers a set of eleven often studied countries,
and panel (b) considers all middle income countries. In both cases we cannot reject the
null at the 10% signiﬁcance level. That is, we cannot reject the presence of implicit systemic
guarantees. Interestingly, if the crisis dummy is disregarded and the interest rate is regressed
only on the lending boom dummy, the estimated coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the
10% level.
W ew o u l dl i k et on o t et h a ti fw ew e r et od e ﬁne systemic guarantees literally as promises to
hand out a bailout payment to lenders in case of default, we could investigate the proportion
of crises that have triggered this type of bailouts, and then impose rational expectations
to infer the ex-ante implicit guarantee. Bordo and Schwarz (2001) survey the bailouts that
have been granted during the last two decades and during the early banking crises of the
20th century. They ﬁnd strong evidence of ex-post bailouts.22
Table 3: Implicit Bailout Guarantees
(Estimates of the panel regression:  t j t j t j t j j t j LB D LB i , 1 , , 2 1 , 1 , * ε + α + α + α = − − )
a) Group of 11 b) Group of 39
Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 1 Reg. 2
LB j,t-1 1.3550 0.6434 0.7236 -0.1883
St. Er. 0.7693 0.7348 0.3488 0.4856
P-val. 0.0805 0.3828 0.0416 0.6986
Dj,t*LB j,t-1 3.4468 2.8336
St. Er. 1.0362 1.0075
P-val. 0.0011 0.0054
R-Square 0.401 0.502 0.631 0.634
# of obs. 143 143 244 244
Note: i is the spread between the real lending rate and the US federal funds rate. The lending boom dummy, LB,
is equal to one if the growth rate of real credit has been larger than 10% on average for the past two years. The
crisis dummy, D, indicates that a twin crisis occurred in t or t+1. The regressions are estimated with fixed
effects, using a GLS estimator. Bold numbers represent significance at the 10% level.
22See also IMF (1998) and Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2000).
23Asymmetric Financing Opportunities
In many middle income countries there is anecdotal evidence that most of the agents who
are credit constrained and have access only to bank ﬁnancing are in the N-Sector, whereas
most ﬁrms that are unconstrained and have access to sources of ﬁnance other than banks,
such as bond and equity markets, are in the T-Sector.
Evidence on asymmetries in ﬁnancing opportunities exist for individual countries. For
instance Ber, Blass and Oved (2002) show that in Isreal non-exporting ﬁrms are more credit
constraint than exporting ﬁrms. To establish the existence of this asymmetry more generally,
we use ﬁrm level data from a panel of 3877 ﬁrms, covering 27 out of our sample of 39 middle
income countries.23 This data set is part of the World Business Economic Survey (WBES,
2001) of the World Bank.24
In this survey ﬁrms were classiﬁed according to their size and, among other things, were
asked whether or not they export.25 Since the share of tradable output in the group of
export ﬁrms is greater than that of non-export ﬁrms, it is reasonable to identify exporters
with T-sector ﬁrms and non-exporters as N-sector ﬁrms. Using this classiﬁcation we ﬁnd
that in most countries a majority of small ﬁrms belong to the N-sector, while a majority of
large ﬁrms belong to the T-sector.26 In table 4 we see that in the set of 27 countries, 68% of
small and medium ﬁrms belong to the N-sector, while 67% of the large ﬁr m sb e l o n gt ot h e
T-sector.




Source: World Business Environment Survey (WBES), 2001.
Note: “small” denotes small and medium firms up to 200 employees. “large” firms have more than 200
employees.
F i r m sw e r ea l s oa s k e dt or a n ko nas c a l ef r o m1t o4 ,h o wm u c ho fa no b s t a c l eﬁnancing
was to running their business. We use the answers from this survey to estimate an ordered
probit model to assess whether there exists an asymmetry in ﬁnancing opportunities across
23Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Hungary, Indonesia, Lithuania,
Mexico, Malaysia, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, Thailand, Thurkey, Tunesia, Uruguay and Venezuela.
24The data base is available from the World Bank at: http://www1.worldbank.org/beext/resources/assess-
wbessurvey-alt.htm
See Schiﬀer and Weder (2001) for a complete discription of the data base.
25Firms with up to 200 workers, are classiﬁed as small and medium enterprises (SME).
26There are some large ﬁrms that belong to the N-sector, such as utilities. However, in most countries
they represent a small share of the ﬁrms in the N-sector that were surveyed.
24the N and T-sectors in middle income countries.27,28
We create a dummy variable for the yes-or-no answer “do you export?” A signiﬁcant
positive parameter on the dummy indicates that N-sector ﬁrms evaluate the access to ﬁnance
as a signiﬁcantly larger obstacle to running their business than T-sector ﬁrms do. Table 5a
reports the regression results for the basic regression, and table 5b reports the results of a
regression that includes two control variables: the age of the ﬁrm and the share of government
participation.
In all regressions we ﬁnd that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between exporters and
non-exporters in their evaluation of obtaining ﬁnancing as an obstacle for running their
businesses. The latter evaluate the obstacle to be more severe. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that
among exporters, the larger the share of exports in output, the less signiﬁcant is ﬁnancing
deemed to be as an obstacle for running a business.
We also ﬁnd that older ﬁrms have easier access to ﬁnancing than younger ﬁrms. The
same is true for ﬁrms with a high government participation. None of the control variables,
however, obviates the role of the exporters/non-exporters indicator.
27We estimate ordered probit regressions of the following form.
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n ∈ {9,27}, and EXPORT is either a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm does not export, or it
is share exports in output among exporting ﬁrms. GOV controls for government participation in the ﬁrm,
AGE denotes the year a ﬁrm was established and d1...dn are country dummies. The dependent variable, y,
captures the ranking of the severity of an obstacle for running a business, as perceived by the ﬁrms. The
obstacles considered are ﬁnancing, collateral and the exchange rate. The true y is not directly observed and
the α parameters are estimated together with β0...β3 and γ1...γn.
28We use the same approach as Schiﬀer and Weder (2001), who compare small and large ﬁrms with respect
to ﬁnancing constraints as well as other indicators of goverance. They ﬁnd that small ﬁrms are more ﬁnancing
constrained.
25Table 5: Asymmetric Financing Opportunities (Evidence from firm level data)
(Estimates of an ordered probit regression)
(a) Tradable vs. Non-tradable:
a) 9 often studied
countries:
b) 27 Middle income
countries:
















Note: Ordered Probit regressions are specified with a constant and with country dummies. The dependent
variable is the answer to the question “is financing a major obstacle to running your business?”. The answer is
evaluated on a scale from 1 to 4. The independent variable in Regression 1 is a dummy that is equal to one for N
sector firms and zero otherwise. In regression 2, it is the share of exports among T-sector firms. Bold numbers
represent significance at the 10% level. The standard errors are reported in parenthesis below the point estimates.
Table 5: continued
(b) Other control variables: Small vs. Large Firms, Age and Government Participation
c) 9 often studies
countries:




















Note: Regression 3 is estimated as regressions 1 and 2, but including the following independent variables:
NL=Non-tradable and large, NS=Non-tradable and small, the age of the firm and the share of government
participation. Also see notes to panel (a).
265. Conceptual Framework
To explain some of the stylized facts that we have described ‘third generation’ crises models
have looked to ﬁnancial market imperfections as key ‘fundamentals’. The models are typi-
cally based on one of two distortions: either “bad policy”, in the form of bailout guarantees,
or “bad markets”, in the form asymmetric information, or the imperfect enforceability of
contracts in ﬁnancial markets.29 On the one hand, bailout guarantees lead agents to under-
take excessive risk. This can explain dollar denominated debt and overinvestment. On the
other hand, ﬁnancial frictions lead lenders to be very conservative and give rise to credit
constraints. This can explain credit crunches and underinvestment. In general, these distor-
tions neutralize each other: when guarantees are present lenders might not care whether a
borrower will repay. Thus, credit constraints will not arise in equilibrium.
Schneider and Tornell (2000), henceforth ST, consider an economy where these two distor-
tions do not neutralize each other and show how their interaction generates several features
of the boom cycle, as well as the comovements alluded to above. In this section we present
some elements of ST’s model that will be useful to rationalize the dynamic patters observed
along boom cycles.
There are two goods in the economy: a tradable (T) and a nontradable (N). We will
denote their relative price (i.e., the inverse of the real exchange rate) by pt =
pN,t
pT,t.
The model has three distinctive features. First, the only source of uncertainty is endoge-
nous real exchange rate risk: in equilibrium pt+1 might equal pt+1 with probability α or p
t+1
with probability 1−α. T h i sc a p t u r e st h ef a c tt h a tc r i s e sa r et y p i c a l l yn o tp r e c e d e db yl a r g e
exogenous shocks. The second feature is that only N-sector agents may be subject to credit
constraints. This captures the fact that in middle income countries T-sector ﬁrms have easy
access to external ﬁnance because they can either pledge export receivables as collateral, or
can get guarantees from closely linked ﬁrms. In contrast, collateralized bank credit is prac-
tically the only source of external ﬁnance for small and N-sector ﬁrms. The third feature is
that there are systemic bailout guarantees.
The N-Sector
There is a continuum of ﬁrms run by overlapping generations of managers. These ﬁrms
produce N-goods using only N-goods as inputs according to a linear production technology
qt+1 = θI t (5.1)
Investment It is ﬁnanced with internal funds wt and with debt. In order to model the
debt-denomination decision N-sector agents are allowed to issue either ‘risky debt’ or ‘safe
debt’. Risky debt is denominated in T goods (foreign currency) on an unhedged basis, while
safe debt is denominated in N goods. To make matters concrete it is assumed that the
29See for instance, Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000), Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2000),
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (1999), Calvo (1998), Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999), Krugman (1999)
and Mckinnon and Pill (1998).
27representative ﬁrm begins period t with internal funds wt, and raises an amount bt + bn
t by









Since bt and bn
t are measured in T-goods, the budget constraint is
ptIt = wt + bt + b
n
t (5.3)
At time t +1a ﬁrm’s cash ﬂo wi nt e r m so fT - g o o d si s
π(pt+1) := pt+1θIt − Lt+1 − pt+1L
n
t+1 (5.4)
If the ﬁrm is solvent (π(pt+1)> 0), the manager pays out a fraction c of proﬁts as dividends
to himself and passes on the remainder to the next manager. If a ﬁrm is insolvent (i.e.,
π(pt+1)< 0), all returns are dissipated in the bankruptcy procedure. In this case the new
cohort of managers receives an ‘aid payment’ e to jump start their ﬁrms. Lastly, in period 0
there is both a cohort of initial incumbent managers who have an amount q0 of nontradables
to sell and a cohort of new managers who have an endowment e0 in terms of tradables. It
follows that internal funds evolve according to w0 = e0, and for t ≥ 1:
wt =
½
[1 − c]π(pt) if π(pt) > 0
e otherwise (5.5)
Distortions
N-sector ﬁnancing is subject to two distortions: contract enforceability problems and
bailout guarantees. It is well known that in an economy in which only enforceability problems
are present, like in standard ﬁnancial accelerator models, the amount of credit available to
a ﬁrm is determined by its internal funds (wt).30
Let us introduce bailout guarantees. If all debt were covered by ‘unconditional’ guarantees
(i.e., if bailouts were granted whenever there is an individual default), then enforceability
problems would not generate credit constraints because lenders would be bailed out in all
states of the world. Thus, in order for credit constraints to arise in equilibrium some portion
of debt must be covered only by ‘systemic’ bailout guarantees. That is, bailouts are granted
only if a critical mass of agents defaults. For concreteness we assume that a bailout occurs
i fa n do n l yi fm o r et h a n5 0 %o fﬁrms are insolvent (π(pt+1) < 0)i nag i v e np e r i o d .D u r i n g
a bailout an international organization pays lenders a fraction F ∈ {0,1} of the outstanding
debts of all defaulting managers, regardless of debt-denomination (N- or T-goods).
The T-sector
The N-sector will take center stage in the model. For our purposes it is suﬃcient to think
of the T-sector as a group of agents that demands N-goods (Dt) and produces tradable
30See Bernanke et. al. (2000).
28goods (qtr
t ). What is important for the argument is that the demand function for N-goods
be downward-sloping and that it be expected to increase at some point in the future. Thus,
we assume that Dt(pt)=dt
pt. Hence, the market clearing condition for non-tradables is
dt
pt
+ It = q
n
t . (5.6)
where It is the investment demand of the N-sector. The supply of T-goods qtr
t will play
no role in the model. In fact qtr
t will only appear in Section 6 when we refer to the gross
domestic product: GDPt = qtr
t + ptqnt
t . In order to link the model to the facts in Section 6,
it will not be necessary that qtr
t be decreasing in pt. We thus simply assume that qtr
t follows
a linear trend: qtr
t = εqtr
t−1, where ε is an arbitrary constant.
5.1. Currency Mismatch and Endogenous Real Exchange Rate Risk
The ﬁr s tm a i nr e s u l to fS Ti st h a tt h einteraction of systemic bailout guarantees and en-
forceability problems can generate endogenousr e a le x c h a n g er a t er i s k .T h i si sb e c a u s et h e r e
is a self-reinforcing mechanism at work. On the one hand, if there is suﬃcient real exchange
rate risk: (a) credit constraints arise and (b) it is individually optimal for an N-sector agent
to issue risky T-debt (i.e., borrow in foreign currency on a short-term and unhedged basis).
On the other hand, if many N-sector agents gamble by denominating their debt in T goods,
exchange rate risk might be endogenously created, as the economy becomes vulnerable to
self-fulﬁlling meltdowns of the banking system. If the amount of T denominated debt is
high, a real depreciation can severely squeeze cash ﬂow, or even bankrupt banks altogether.
Since they face binding borrowing constraints, they then have to curtail lending to the N-
sector. Weak investment demand from the N-sector for its own products in turn validates
the real depreciation. The systemic credit risk created by the banking system thus induces
endogenous exchange rate risk.
Risky Debt Denomination
Suppose that there is enough real exchange rate variability in the sense that ¯ pt+1 will be
high enough so as to make the production of N goods a positive NPV activity, while p
t+1 will
be low enough so as to bankrupt ﬁr m sw i t hT - d e b to nt h e i rb o o k s( π(p
t+1) < 0).S Ts h o w
that in this case lenders constrain credit to ensure that borrowers will repay in the no-crisis
state, and borrowers ﬁnd it optimal to denominate all debt in T-goods. Since the bailout
agency will repay lenders in the crisis state, the expected repayment per unit debt is lower








This is because since shifting from N to T- debt reduces the expected debt burden, lenders
are willing to lend more at each level of internal funds.
A disadvantage of T-debt is that it might lead to insolvency. Since there are bankruptcy
costs, when there are no bailout guarantees, it is optimal for an agent to denominate all debt
29in N-goods. However, if crises are rare events (α is large) and bailouts are generous (F is
large), then it is individually optimal to denominate debt in T goods.
Since the production of N-goods is a positive NPV activity, managers will borrow as
much as possible and set investment expenditure equal to ptIt = wt +¯ bt +¯ bn
t . Using (5.7) we
obtain the well known result that investment of a credit constrained ﬁrm depends not only






ms if bt =0
mr if bn
t =0 (5.8)
where mt =1+Ht denotes the investment multiplier.
Real Exchange Rate Risk
Next we reverse the question and ask when is it that a risky debt structure can generate
real exchange rate risk. Suppose that incumbent managers enter the current period with a
supply of nontradables qt and a debt burden Lt + ptLn
t .
As long as incumbents are solvent, internal funds are wt =( 1−c)πt, where πt = ptθIt −
Lt − ptLn
t . In contrast, if the bad state is realized and ﬁrms become insolvent, the new
cohort starts out with an endowment e of T goods. Investment expenditure is thus ptIt =
ηt[ptqt − Lt − ptLn
t ] if ptqt ≥ Lt + ptLn
t , or ptIt = mte otherwise (the cash ﬂow multiplier ηt
is deﬁned by ηt := (1 − c)mt).
The equilibrium real exchange rate equalizes total demand for and the supply of non-
tradables. Since the T-sector’s demand for non-tradables is equal to dt/pt,
ptqt =
½
dt + ηt [ptqt − Lt − ptLn
t ] if ptqt ≥ Lt + ptLn
t
dt + mte otherwise (5.9)
Since supply is predetermined (qt = θIt−1), the key to having multiple equilibria is a backward
bending aggregate demand curve, as in Graph 1. This is impossible if there is only N-debt
(Lt =0 ). However, multiple equilibria are possible if there is T-debt (and Ln
t =0 ). In this
case price movements aﬀect revenues, but keep the debt burden unchanged. For prices below
the cutoﬀ price pc
t = Lt
qt , all N-ﬁrms go bankrupt, and total demand is downward sloping. In
contrast, for prices above pc
t, investment demand is increasing in price. ST show that this
makes total demand ‘bend backward’ and cross the supply schedule twice (as in Graph 1) if
and only if
Lt >d t + mte and ηt > 1 (5.10)
A ‘strong balance sheet eﬀect’ (ηt > 1) means that an increase in N-sector’s cash ﬂow induces
a more than proportional increase in the N-sector’s expenditure on its own goods. As we
shall see, ηt > 1 is not only necessary for self-fulﬁlling crises, but it is also key for the
existence of lending booms.
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 Demand




We have seen that if there is enough expected real exchange rate variability, then agents
choose a risky debt denomination. Furthermore, in the presence of a enough T-debt, there
are multiple possible values for the real exchange rate. In this subsection we will exhibit an
equilibrium along which these elements belong a consistent dynamic story.
Consider a typical period 0 <t<T− 1 during which all inherited debt is denominated
in T goods and agents believe that at t +1there will be a crisis with probability 1 − α.
Since in the good state in period t ﬁrms are solvent, internal funds are given by wt =
(1 − c)(ptqt − Lt). Since the debt burden equals (1 + r)bt−1 =( 1+r)Hrwt−1 and output is
qt = θIt−1 =
θmrwt−1
pt−1 , it follows that any equilibrium path of N-output and internal funds









rwt−1 − d],t < T (5.12)
with initial conditions q0 and w0 = e0,a n dw h e r eηr =( 1− c)mr > 1 is the risky cash ﬂow
multiplier. The solution to (5.11)-(5.12) determines the ‘lucky path,’ along which no crisis








1 ≤ t<T (5.13)
31The lucky path is part of an equilibrium provided that along this path agents expect: (i)
as u ﬃciently low price during a crisis, so that it is possible to claim the bailout subsidy by
choosing a risky debt denomination that leads to insolvency in the bad state (π(p
t+1) < 0);
(ii) as u ﬃciently high return on investment in the absence of a crisis (θ¯ pt+1/pt > 1+r),
and (iii) as u ﬃciently low probability of a crisis (α>α ), which ensures that the ex-ante
expected return is high enough and credit constraints bind.
Since during a crisis, internal funds of the new cohort are wt+1 = e, π(p
t+1) < 0 is
equivalent to p
t+1qt+1 −Lt+1 = d+mre−(1+r)Hrwt−1 < 0. This condition holds provided
wt−1 is high enough.
The return θ¯ pt+1/pt is high enough provided investment demand grows suﬃciently fast
relative to supply. Since tomorrow’s supply is determined by today’s investment, tomorrow’s
investment must grow fast enough. But, since borrowing constraints bind, this can only
happen if internal funds grow fast enough. How can we ensure this will happen? It is apparent
from (5.12) that if wt is increasing over time, it will do so at an increasing rate. Thus, if
initial internal funds e0 are above a certain threshold and α is large enough, investment will
have a positive NPV for all t<T− 1 provided, of course, that investment is proﬁtable at
T − 1. This is the case if the future increase in the demand for N-goods is large enough so
as to allow the N-sector to repay its accumulated debt at time T.
Suppose that a crisis hits at some time τ<T− 1. At the time of crisis internal funds
collapse to e. Thereafter, managers will choose safe plans and will invest in N-production
if the return is high enough. Along the post-crisis path all debt will be denominated in N-
goods, so the debt burden will be (1 + r)Hswt−1. Thus, N-output and internal funds evolve
according to (5.11)-(5.12) replacing mr by ms, with initial conditions qτ = θIτ−1 and wτ = e.
ST show that if initial internal funds are high enough (e0 >e 0(d)), there is a range of
crisis probabilities, (1 − α) ∈ (0,1 − α(e0)), for which internal funds increase over time,
agents choose a risky debt structure and a crisis can occur during the next period with
conditional probability 1 − α. Along the lucky path the N-sector expands, running a deﬁcit
in anticipation of strong T-sector demand in the future. Debt and investment expenditure
rise over time as the N-sector issues new debt to cover the sequence of deﬁcits. A large shift
in the T-sector demand in the ﬁnal period (ˆ d>d(e0,α,T)) ensures that the accumulated
debt can be repaid in case no crisis had occurred by T −1. Finally, if a crisis occurs at some
time τ, the economy follows a safe path thereafter.
6. Linking the Model to the Stylized Facts
In this section we show that the evolution of the model economy along the equilibrium path
resembles the typical boom-bust cycle described in Section 2.
If there is a strong balance sheet eﬀect (ηt > 1), both the value of N-output (ptqnt
t =
d + mrwt) and N-sector’s internal funds wt rise as long as no crisis occurs. Since along the
equilibrium path there are binding borrowing constraints, credit is determined by N-sector’s
internal funds: bt =( mr−1)wt. Therefore, credit follows the same path as wt. Initially credit
grows slowly, but it accelerates over time. This might generate a lending boom along which
32the credit-to-GDP ratio increases. To see this note that GDP equals qtr
t + ptqnt
t . Thus, in






t−1 + d + mrwt
Since internal funds grow at an increasing rate (because there is a strong balance sheet
eﬀect), the credit-to-GDP ratio may follow an increasing path from some point on provided
the growth rate of tradables production ε is not too large.
I no r d e rt om a t c ht h es t y l i z e df a c tt h a tp r i o rto a crisis a real appreciation coincides with
a lending boom it is necessary that both pt and the credit-to-GDP ratio rise along the lucky
path. Although the value of output (ptqt) grows, pt and qt need not rise simultaneously. The
technology parameter θ in (5.1) determines how the rise in value translates into changes in
prices and quantities. If θ were very high, supply would outpace demand. As a result the
price would fall over time, while investment would rise. Thus, in order for the real exchange
rate to appreciate it is necessary that θ be low enough.
A strong balance sheet eﬀect also implies that a self-fulﬁlling real depreciation can lead
to widespread bankruptcies in the N-sector and a protracted credit crunch. If a crisis occurs




qτ ,N - s e c t o rﬁrms
become insolvent and internal funds collapse to a level e. This generates a drop in investment
that validates the real depreciation.
L e tu sd e ﬁne a ‘credit-crunch’ as a declining path of the credit-to-GDP ratio. Since in the
aftermath of a crisis internal funds collapse (wτ = e ), the growth rate of credit falls (because
a strong balance sheet eﬀect implies that wt/wt−1 is increasing in wt). On the other hand,
the growth rate of tradables production remains unchanged. As a result, in the aftermath of
crisis the credit-to-GDP ratio follows a declining path for a while until internal funds recover.
Note that if e is below a critical level, GDP declines at the time of the crisis. Thereafter, the
recession might continue for a few more periods. However, since the T-sector continues to
grow in the aftermath of a crisis, a resumption of GDP growth can coexist with a deepening
credit crunch.
Now consider the asymmetric sectorial pattern: the N-sector outperforms the T-sector
d u r i n gt h eb o o m ,w h i l et h eo p p o s i t ei st r u ed u r i n gt h eb u s t .I nt h em o d e lT - o u t p u tg r o w s
at a rate: gtr = ε − 1, while the growth rate of N-output (gnt
t =
qt
qt−1 − 1) is given by (5.11).








This equation states that the fraction of N-production that is invested by the N-sector
depends on the ﬁnancial strength of the N-sector. If internal funds are low, N-ﬁrms can
borrow very little. Holding supply ﬁxed, weak investment demand implies that the price
is low and the T-sector absorbs a large fraction of N-output. Thus, there can be an initial
period during which the T-sector outpaces the N-sector. However, along the lucky path
33internal funds grow gradually. Thus, the N-sector is able to borrow more over time, and is
able to bid a greater share of N-supply away from the T-sector. In other words, both wt and
gnt
t accelerate over time. Therefore, if the boom lasts long enough, there is a time when the
N-sector will start to grow faster than the T-sector provided ε is not too large.
The collapse in N-ﬁrms’ internal funds during a crisis leads to a fall in both N-output
and its growth rate (gnt
τ+1 < 0). Thereafter, if ε is relatively high, gnt
t will remain below gtr
for a while until internal funds have grown suﬃciently. We thus have a simple version of the
asymmetric sectorial pattern that actually takes place during boom-bust cycles. Clearly, in
a less stylized model, in which T-production is decreasing in pt, the amplitude of the cycles
experienced by the N-to-T output ratio would be greater.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that the typical lending boom in the model economy
need not end in crisis. Furthermore, the likelihood of self-fulﬁlling crises is not a free para-
meter. ST show that equilibria exist only if the probability of crisis during a given period
(1−α) is small. If crises were not rare events, binding borrowing constraints would not arise
in the ﬁrst place.
347. Conclusions
This paper makes three key points. First, the macroeconomic patterns experienced by middle
income countries during the last two decades have many features that are common across
this set of countries. Financial liberalizations have been typically followed by lending booms
that sometimes end in twin currency and banking crises. Interestingly, the co-movements of
key macroeconomic variables have not been signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across countries that have
ﬁxed exchnage rate regimes and those that do not.
The second point is that these co-movements are quite diﬀerent from the ones observed
in countries with well developed ﬁnancial markets like the US. They reﬂect an asymmetry in
ﬁnancing opportunities across tradable and nontradables sectors, a severe currency mismatch
and strong balance sheet eﬀects.
The third point we make is that the co-movements of credit, the real exchange rate and
the ratio of nontradables-to-tradables output, as well as the occurrence of twin crises can be
rationalized by combining credit market imperfections with institutions that cover private
losses during systemic crises.
Lots of empirical work remains to be done in order to better characterize the mechanisms
that underlie the boom-bust cycle. For instance, it is important to develop ﬁrm level data
sets that will cover several countries and that will allow us to classify ﬁrms along several di-
mensions (for instance, small vs. large, nontradables vs. tradables, etc.). Furthermore, these
data sets should allow researchers to obtain information regarding investment opportunities
and sources of external ﬁnance (e.g., bank credit, equity, bonds). Most of the existent data
sets only include ﬁrms that are listed in stock exchanges. Since in middle income countries
the listed ﬁrms are typically the largest ﬁrms, most of the existent data sets exclude small
and medium sized enterprises.
Finally, it is important to have a better understanding of the types of bailout guarantees
which are prevalent in diﬀerent economies. Bailout guarantees are not limited to explicit
promises to bailout creditors in case of default by borrowers. More generally, guarantees
are implicit in exchange rate and monetary policies intended to avoid drastic declines in
aggregate output and to safe the ﬁnancial system from systemic shocks.
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38Appendix
Criteria for country selection:
In the world bank development indicators data base, we consider countries:
a)  That have a stock market and the value of the stocks traded as a share of GDP is larger than 1%.
b)  That have a population of more than 1 million people.
c)  With per capita income of more than 1000$ but less than 18000$
d)  That are not engaged in war or civil war (Iran, Irak, Yugoslavia and lebanon)
In addition, we consider Finland and Sweden, who experienced often studied joint currency and banking crisis.
In total we have 39 countries. The sample covers 20 years, from 1980 to 1999. The panel is unbalanced, as not
all series cover the full sample or are available for all countries. The data set is available from the authors upon
request.
Crisis dates:
Banking Crisis (BC) and Currency Crisis (CC) dates are taken from Frankel and Rose (1996), Capiro and
Klingbiel (1997) and Tornell (1999). A Joint crisis is defined as an event where A) BC and CC occurs in the
same year, or consecutive years. B) in consecutive years, the year of the crisis is the year of the latter of the two.
C) A joint crisis does not count if it occurs within three year before or after another joint crisis, or when crisis
occur three or more years in a row. Out of our sample of 39 countries, 20 have experienced joint crises. The
remaining 19 are part of the control group and effect the regression results only via affecting the mean of tranquil
times.
CC BC Joint CC BC Joint CC BC Joint CC BC Joint







Greece 83, 85 - - Mexico * 82, 85,
88, 94
81, 94 82, 94 Slovenia - - -
Brazil * 87, 90,
95, 98













87 88 Spain 82, 92,
94
--
Colombia - 82 - Ireland 86, 92 - - Peru * 84, 88,
90, 92
83 84 Sweden * 92 91 91
Croatia - - - Israel - - - Philippines * 82, 83,
86, 90,
97
81, 97 97 Thailand * 97 83, 97 97
Czech
Republic
- - - Jordan * 89 89 89 Poland - - - Tunisia - - -
Ecuador * 82, 84,
85, 88,
91, 98
81, 98 82, 98 Korea,
Rep. *





Egypt * 89 90 90 Latvia - - - Russia - 98 - Uruguay * 82, 83,
86
81 82






Finland * 86, 91,
93
91 91 Malaysia * 97 85, 97 97 Slovak
Republic
---Indicators of tadability in Manufacturing and Services:
Standard deviations of the sectoral real
exchange rate
Exports / GDP
manufacturing services manufacturing services
ARG 0.239 0.348 0.343 0.029
BRA 0.185 0.238 0.340 0.018
CHL 0.259 0.338 1.261 0.086
COL 0.236 0.267 0.723 0.049
CRO 0.100 0.127 1.264 0.402
CZE NA 0.123 NA 0.231
ECU 0.156 0.342 1.080 0.075
EGY 0.416 0.458 0.614 0.245
EST 0.301 0.369 2.238 0.324
FIN 0.130 0.142 1.129 0.092
GRC 0.079 0.081 0.685 0.130
HUN 0.029 0.281 1.420 0.138
IDN 0.262 0.410 1.304 0.048
IRL NA NA NA 0.127
I S R N AN A N AN A
JOR 0.225 0.307 1.774 0.438
KOR 0.138 0.148 0.967 0.089
LTU 0.571 0.652 1.892 0.161
LVA 0.542 0.478 1.283 0.268
MEX 0.148 0.264 0.855 0.040
MOR 0.141 0.242 0.950 0.122
MYS 0.149 0.207 2.639 0.200
NZL 0.145 0.163 1.126 0.092
PER 0.243 0.229 0.460 0.051
PHL 0.120 0.154 0.853 0.180
POL NA NA 1.013 0.101
PRT 0.133 0.175 0.810 0.123
RUS NA 0.355 NA 0.065
SAU 0.315 0.236 5.861 0.087
SLK NA 0.082 1.984 0.224
SLN 0.086 0.085 1.852 0.227
SOU 0.175 0.188 1.131 0.062
SPA 0.117 0.139 0.611 0.139
SWE 0.108 0.111 1.320 0.106
THA 0.088 0.170 0.992 0.140
TUN 0.223 0.204 1.652 0.219
TUR 0.134 0.127 0.656 0.113
URU 0.223 0.310 0.668 0.108
VEN 0.321 0.414 1.363 0.032
Note:  We would expect non-tradables sectors to experience a higher sectoral real exchange rate variance. We
consider 3 sectors: construction, services and Manufacturing. We proxy for tradables and non-tradables output in
the following way. If there exists construction data, we classify construction as N by default. We then classify as
T the sector that exhibits the least variable sectoral real exchange rate. If construction data are not available, we
classify  as non-tradable the sector with the least variable exchange rate. The table presents information that






 Non-tradables-to-Tradables Output RatioFigure A: Continued
Investment/GDP
Consumption/GDP
Note: Fixed and non-fixed regimes are determined according to the de Jure classification by Berger et. al
(2001). For the construction of the event windows see footnote to figure 1.Figure B: the boom bust cycle in 11 frequently studied countries:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Finland, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines,
Sweden, Thailand
1/ Real Exchange Rate (growth rates)
Real GDP (growth rates)  Real GDP – deviations from HP-Trend
Real credit (growth rates) Real Credit – dev. from HP-Trend









































































t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 Figure B: continued
N/T (Levels) Terms of Trade
Interest rate spread (levels) Real interest rates (levels)







































































t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3Data sources:
Real exchange rate: IMF, International financial Statistics, CD-ROM. (Lines ..RECZF)
Real GDP growth rates: World Bank Development indicators (Code: NY.GDP.MKTP.KN)
Real credit growth: IMF, International financial Statistics, CD-ROM. Claims on private sector by deposit money
banks (Lines 22d..ZF), divided by CPI (Lines 64..ZF)
Deposits: IMF, International financial Statistics, CD-ROM. (Demand deposits, Lines 24..ZF + Time, savings and
foreign currency deposits, Lines 25..ZF)
N/T: Services: World Bank Development indicators (Code: NV.SRV.TETC.KN), Manufacturing: World Bank
Development indicators (Code: NV.IND.MANF.KN), Construction: OECD Statistical Compendium, Main
indicators of industrial activity and individual central banks.
Interest rate spread: World Bank Development indicators (Code: FR.INR.LNDP)
Real interest rate: World Bank Development indicators (Code: FR.INR.RINR)
Gross domestic fixed investment: World Bank Development indicators (Code: NE.GDI.FTOT.KN)
Private Consumption: World Bank Development indicators (Code: NE.CON.PRVT.KN)
Dates of financial liberalization: see Baekert et.al (2001).